Masoud Pezeshkian, the only reformist candidate allowed in the race after being excluded in 2021, took first place with 10.41 million votes, ahead of his ultra-conservative rival and former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, with 9.47 million, out of 24 .5 million votes cast. , or just about 40 percent of the 61 million voters.
Surprisingly, the speaker of the Majles and former mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, whom some polls had indicated as the main contender over Pezeshkian and Jalili, came in third place with 3.38 million votes, while the only cleric in the race, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, had to be content with 206,397 votes
Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani and Vice President Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, both conservatives, had resigned days before Friday's election. The vote count suggests that the conservatives' combined votes in next Friday's runoff will be enough to propel Jalili to victory, unless more voters from the largely disenchanted abstentionist majority abandon their apathy and head to the polls to support Pezeshkian.
In the present case, calls for support from former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hasan Rouhani and former Foreign Minister Javed Zarif did not appear to have been sufficient to galvanize the reformist vote.
While Qalibaf, Zakani and Ghazizadeh have now asked their followers to vote for Jalili in the second round to ensure the victory of the “revolutionary front”, Pourmohammadi's response was more meaningful and nuanced. "Greetings to all who came to vote on June 29, and I respect all those who did not believe us and did not come. His presence and absence are full of messages that I hope are heard. His message is clear and unequivocal," he said in a message on social networks.
Indeed, Pourmohammadi, who although considered a conservative and persecuted for his role in extrajudicial executions in the 1980s, along with the late president Ebrahim Raisi, whose death in a helicopter crash last month sparked the elections, surprised the people with their disapproval of Internet bans. . He also advocated for greater participation of women in the Majles.
His stance can be considered unexpected and not unprecedented: since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has had eight presidents, of whom five were clerics, from hardline conservatives (current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Raisi) to moderate conservatives (Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani). , to the reformists (Mohammad Khatami and Hasan Rouhani). On the other hand, the relative performance of Jalili, a recognized intransigent, and Qalibaf, who sought to present himself as a more pragmatic conservative, or the fact that both remained in the race, raises some interesting questions.
Jalili, who had participated in the 2013 elections but lost to Rouhani and filed nominations in 2021, where he withdrew in favor of Raisi, and Qalibaf, who was also a fairly perennial presidential candidate (2005, 2013, 2017), like the former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaee. (2005, 2009, 2013, 2021), have many similarities.
Both are close to Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC and have extensive security credentials: Jalili is a nuclear deal negotiator and currently the Supreme Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council, while Qalibaf was a former air force commander of the IRGC and then the country's police chief. However, Qalibaf, who gained the support of prominent figures in the security establishment such as Major General Rezaee (retired) and former Defense Minister and Navy chief, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, among others. ended up getting almost a third of the votes that Jalili got, indicating that the establishment does not think or operate in a monolithic way. However, the more doctrinaire element seems to maintain its predominance over the realist.
With Jalili the favorite to win in the runoff as conservative votes unite, it is tempting to see his presidency as a continuation of the Raisi era, as he was a key influence on the late president, but the situation is not so clear .
While foreign or nuclear policy may not see much change under Jalili (or, indeed, under Pezeshkian, for all his rhetoric, given the limitations of the President's role), both have policy overlap on several issues. internally, in particular, in matters of economic development. well-being and job creation. However, Pezeshkian is more direct on social issues, especially the role of the moral police, which he opposes. It remains to be seen, however, whether more reformists, excited by the prospect of a Pezeshki victory, will come forward.
Surprisingly, the speaker of the Majles and former mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, whom some polls had indicated as the main contender over Pezeshkian and Jalili, came in third place with 3.38 million votes, while the only cleric in the race, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, had to be content with 206,397 votes
Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani and Vice President Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, both conservatives, had resigned days before Friday's election. The vote count suggests that the conservatives' combined votes in next Friday's runoff will be enough to propel Jalili to victory, unless more voters from the largely disenchanted abstentionist majority abandon their apathy and head to the polls to support Pezeshkian.
In the present case, calls for support from former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hasan Rouhani and former Foreign Minister Javed Zarif did not appear to have been sufficient to galvanize the reformist vote.
While Qalibaf, Zakani and Ghazizadeh have now asked their followers to vote for Jalili in the second round to ensure the victory of the “revolutionary front”, Pourmohammadi's response was more meaningful and nuanced. "Greetings to all who came to vote on June 29, and I respect all those who did not believe us and did not come. His presence and absence are full of messages that I hope are heard. His message is clear and unequivocal," he said in a message on social networks.
Indeed, Pourmohammadi, who although considered a conservative and persecuted for his role in extrajudicial executions in the 1980s, along with the late president Ebrahim Raisi, whose death in a helicopter crash last month sparked the elections, surprised the people with their disapproval of Internet bans. . He also advocated for greater participation of women in the Majles.
His stance can be considered unexpected and not unprecedented: since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has had eight presidents, of whom five were clerics, from hardline conservatives (current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Raisi) to moderate conservatives (Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani). , to the reformists (Mohammad Khatami and Hasan Rouhani). On the other hand, the relative performance of Jalili, a recognized intransigent, and Qalibaf, who sought to present himself as a more pragmatic conservative, or the fact that both remained in the race, raises some interesting questions.
Jalili, who had participated in the 2013 elections but lost to Rouhani and filed nominations in 2021, where he withdrew in favor of Raisi, and Qalibaf, who was also a fairly perennial presidential candidate (2005, 2013, 2017), like the former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaee. (2005, 2009, 2013, 2021), have many similarities.
Both are close to Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC and have extensive security credentials: Jalili is a nuclear deal negotiator and currently the Supreme Leader's representative to the Supreme National Security Council, while Qalibaf was a former air force commander of the IRGC and then the country's police chief. However, Qalibaf, who gained the support of prominent figures in the security establishment such as Major General Rezaee (retired) and former Defense Minister and Navy chief, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, among others. ended up getting almost a third of the votes that Jalili got, indicating that the establishment does not think or operate in a monolithic way. However, the more doctrinaire element seems to maintain its predominance over the realist.
With Jalili the favorite to win in the runoff as conservative votes unite, it is tempting to see his presidency as a continuation of the Raisi era, as he was a key influence on the late president, but the situation is not so clear .
While foreign or nuclear policy may not see much change under Jalili (or, indeed, under Pezeshkian, for all his rhetoric, given the limitations of the President's role), both have policy overlap on several issues. internally, in particular, in matters of economic development. well-being and job creation. However, Pezeshkian is more direct on social issues, especially the role of the moral police, which he opposes. It remains to be seen, however, whether more reformists, excited by the prospect of a Pezeshki victory, will come forward.
