For a country that has struggled to contain the threat of terrorism within its borders, Pakistan's military-dominated establishment often hides its shortcomings by blaming the Afghan Taliban and accusing them of providing shelter to terrorist groups attacking Pakistan.

As this convenient scapegoat fails to address the root causes of Pakistan's internal security problems, these threats mark a significant escalation in Islamabad's approach to addressing terrorism, actions that will most likely further strain Islamabad's already fragile relations. and Kabul.

Faced with an exponential rise in terrorist violence in the country, the federal government of Pakistan, under pressure from China, whose five citizens were killed in one such incident on March 26, announced its latest counter-terrorism operation, Azm-i-Istehkam, or Strong Resolution for Stability. , on June 22. A press release from the Pakistan Prime Minister's Office (PMO) stated that this "reinvigorated and revitalized" military campaign "will integrate and synergize multiple lines of effort to combat the threats of extremism and terrorism comprehensively and decisively."

This was followed by Defense Minister Khwaja Asif's statement on June 27, emphasizing in no uncertain terms that Islamabad would not hesitate to attack terrorist groups inside Afghanistan as part of this counter-terrorism offensive.

Operation Azm-i-Istehkam is the latest in a series of military campaigns by the Pakistani state to eradicate terrorism from the country. In 2014, Pakistan launched its first large-scale counterterrorism operation, Zarb-e-Azb, or Sword of the Prophet Muhammad , against various extremist groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in its North Waziristan region. While displacing nearly a million people and killing hundreds of civilians, Pakistan claimed to have managed to dismantle the terrorist ecosystem and eliminate more than 3,500 terrorists.

Despite these claims, the operation failed to address the root causes of extremism in the country, allowing the TTP and other groups to quickly regain strength and engage in anti-state violence.

After Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, or Rejection of Conflict, to consolidate its gains. However, recurring terrorist attacks indicated that the campaign did little to dismantle the terrorist ecosystem in the country, allowing terrorists to operate with relative impunity. The problem with these operations has been their unilateral militaristic approach towards issues that require multifaceted engagement. , something that the Pakistani authorities do not seem willing to adopt.

The Pakistani government's strategy took a more complex turn in August 2021, when it supported the Afghan Taliban to overthrow the republican government of Afghanistan and establish an Islamic Emirate.

The belief was that a friendly regime in Kabul would help contain terrorism away from Pakistan's borders and at the same time provide it with strategic depth to counter regional powers such as India and Iran. However, this expectation turned out to be very short-lived and highly delusional as it did not bring any security dividend to Pakistan. Rather, it appears to have further contributed to Pakistan's internal security votes. The Afghan Taliban, who share ideological ties with the TTP, have little incentive to act against their ideological brethren and credible allies who had fought alongside them against the forces. Americans. As such, it has ignored Islamabad's calls for military action against the TTP, especially after the breakdown of the ceasefire between the Pakistan Army and the TTP in November 2022.

Since then, Pakistan has witnessed an exponential increase in terrorist attacks that have led to the deaths of more than 2,300 members of the Pakistani security forces, the country's federal government says.

Since then, Pakistan has repeatedly blamed the Afghan Taliban for providing safe haven to TTP militants, claiming that these groups "have consistently used Afghan territory to launch terrorist attacks inside Pakistani territory", accusations that Kabul has repeatedly denied. Interestingly , the Afghan Taliban have accused Pakistan's spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, of patronizing the Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), a group that has emerged as the biggest security challenge to the Afghan government and has led to carried out dozens of terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan.

With an unprecedented surge in terrorist attacks in March 2024, in which seven Pakistani soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel and a captain-ranked officer, were killed, Islamabad moved to cross-border airstrikes inside Afghanistan on March 18, 2024. , which demonstrates the level of distrust. between Kabul and Islamabad. Pakistani authorities claimed to have killed eight terrorists in their airstrikes in Paktika and Khost provinces, along the border with Pakistan.

In response, the Afghan Taliban condemned the airstrikes as an outright "violation of Afghan territory," warning Islamabad that such transgressions could "lead to dire consequences that Pakistan will have no control over," even as it mobilized its forces throughout the Durand Line.However, Kabul has consistently denied its support for the Pakistani Taliban. He has reasoned that instead of blaming Afghanistan for its "inability to control violent incidents", Islamabad would be better off looking inward and addressing its internal fissures rather than pointing fingers at others.

As such, Pakistan's threats to repeat such actions not only risk violating international norms but could also trigger a broader conflict in an already volatile region.

The potential for cross-border counterterrorism operations raises several critical questions. First, can Pakistan achieve its security objectives without further destabilizing the region? The answer is uncertain. While attacking militant groups in Afghanistan may bring short-term gains, it will likely provoke retaliatory attacks and deepen the cycle of violence, as their previous military campaigns have demonstrated. It appears that Pakistani authorities, in their attempt to appease China, at whose behest Operation Azm-i-Istehkam is being carried out, they are unwilling to address the root cause of instability in the country.

Furthermore, projecting the specter of an external threat is an obfuscation of the failure of the Pakistani security forces who have adopted counter-terrorism measures for years and have yet to put an end to this threat to the country. It is highly unlikely that the Afghan government will look kindly on such incursions and Islamabad's constant pestering amid its own security problems.

Therefore, as Pakistan embarks on another military campaign, it should remember that any cross-border misadventure in Afghanistan is fraught with risks that could further destabilize an already fragile region. Shehbaz Sharif's government would be doing Pakistan a favor by refraining from to adopt such harsh measures and understand that the path to the country's lasting security and stability does not lie through military transgressions, but rather through comprehensively addressing the root cause of terrorism in a country that currently suffers from socio-economic grievances. center. You must act carefully to avoid becoming involved in a conflict that you cannot control.