"The plan was a blunder and a colossal failure. It not only proved disastrous, but it also violated the Lahore Summit Agreement between India and Pakistan. Moreover, because the Pakistani Army denied its participation, even "Its own soldiers, who were later buried by the Indian armed forces, proved more embarrassing and brought disgrace to the institution," says Colonel (retd) Ashfaq Hussain.

The Kargil conflict took place during May and July 1999.It was a decision taken by some top military chiefs, who launched the operation without taking their Prime Minister at the time, Nawaz Sharif, into confidence.

The main goal of the operation was to cut off connectivity between Kashmir and Ladakh, block National Highway-1 and force the Indian Army to compromise its positions at the Siachen Glacier. The trend in the military mind was that this operation would force India to back down and come to the negotiating table to resolve the Kashmir dispute on Islamabad's terms.

"On the one hand, Pakistan had to face international pressure and on the other, the plan failed miserably because China did not work as per Islamabad's assumptions. Our then Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz had to face China as well as all others. An indifferent attitude was adopted because Islamabad's Hussain said that the story was not bought by anyone that in Kargil it was not his army but the freedom fighters of Kashmir.At that time, General Musharraf was leading the operation, while his team included Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Aziz Khan, Commander 10 Corps Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed and Forces Commander Northern Area Major General Zave Hasan.

While the plan to carry out the Kargil operation was the brainchild of some military chiefs, the overall plan was destined to fail as it was based on wrong assumptions which were kept hidden from the Pakistani Prime Minister as well as the country's Air Force Chiefs. And Navy.

Keeping in mind that the normal practice of both the Indian and Pakistani armies is to abandon their positions at high altitude during the extreme conditions of winter snow weather and re-capture them in the spring, the Pakistani Army and their representatives The forward positions were recaptured and controlled before the Indians could. On the strategic heights of Kargil, Dras and Batalik.

After this, Indian forces started 'Operation Vijay' to recapture their strategic posts.As the fighting between the two sides escalated, the Pakistani side also took advantage of the higher peaks and responded with Indian artillery fire.

"We had the advantage of a high peak position. We could see them from a higher altitude and counter-attack them more effectively," the retired colonel said. Ashafa Hussain, author of the book 'Witness to Blunder', details her first-hand experience while working as an officer in the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) in Rawalpindi.

The plan on the Pakistan side, limited to a few military minds, was that capture of the high peaks of Kargil would force the Indian Army to move away from Siachen and the international community would intervene early to normalize the situation, thereby benefiting Pakistan. .With LOC (Line of Control).

The then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who claimed that he was completely unaware of the Kargil plan in the beginning, seems to have acted in a way that indicated otherwise. It seemed to me that he was aware of the plan but had no idea of ​​the serious consequences of the stunt.

Sharif may be of the view that if the Kargil operation goes according to plan, he will accept it as the conqueror of Kashmir. But due to his limited information about the actual planning and lack of assessment on the counter-offensive strategy adopted by India, Sharif preferred to remain naive and ignorant about the developments.By the end of June the Kargil operation was established as a catastrophic failure, with US President Bill Clinton demanding Pakistan to immediately withdraw its forces from the Indian side of the LOC.

Colonel (retd) Ashfaq Hussain says, “The Kargil adventure was a mistake. It was a bigger mistake than the 1971 surrender."